Though the U.S. was decisively winning in the latter stages of WWII, there remained concern about the inferiority of the Sherman tank in firepower and armor protection to the German Tiger and Panther. It was said that the U.S. had matched the superior quality of the German tanks only by superior quantities of American tanks. And this was largely true. The Sherman did not fare well in tank-to-tank slugging matches with their giant German counterparts-shells often harmlessly bounced off the thick German armor. Interestingly enough, before entering the war, the U.S. did develop some extremely heavy tanks, but later switched to lighter tanks for the following reasons.
The U.S. tanks had to be transported by ship from Detroit, across a vast ocean to land amphibiously on enemy shores. This reality placed great limitations on the size and weight of the tanks. Especially with the frequent U-boat sinkings, the number of U.S. ships was dropping, and the bigger the tank, the fewer a ship could carry.
Another factor that faced the U.S. was moving their armor over bridgeless streams. The U.S. Air Force was targeting enemy bridges as a means of disrupting enemy supply lines, etc. Once these bridges were destroyed, U.S. tanks would have to cross the streams on temporary bridges. Heavy tanks could not have crossed, but the lightweight and nimble Shermans could.
Also, while the Tiger and Panther were made bigger and more powerful than the Sherman was, they were comparatively slow and ponderous. The German tanks were often used as pill-boxes, forced to become immobile and fire at oncoming armor. On the other hand, the Sherman was designed for deep thrusts into the enemy's rear, where it would destroy supply installations and communications. This demanded great speed and minimal fuel consumption.
But perhaps the greatest reason behind the success of the Sherman was its reliability-maximum performance and minimum care and replacement. General George Patten recognized this when he declared, "In mechanical endurance and ease of maintenance our tanks are infinitely superior to any other". This factor played out on the battlefield, allowing the Sherman to out-run, out-maneuver, and ultimately out-fight the Tiger and Panther.
With about 50,000 produced in all variations, the Sherman was the most widely produced tank during the war. The five major variants of the M4 to the M4A4 were designated by the hull and engine used. Although powerful and proven, its high center propeller shaft gave the hull a tall profile. Suspension was a rugged and simple design, known as VVSS (Vertical Volute Spring Suspension), with three units (or bogies) on each side, and each with two road wheels. The transmission was 5-speed forward plus reverse. Early production M4's had a 3-piece front transmission cover, and a cast one-piece steel turret mounting a 75mm main gun. For added protection, oblique armor plates were added to the turret, hull sides and just in front of the forward hull hatches. Production of the M4 began in July 1942, five months later than the cast hulled M4A1. One of the most powerful variants of the M4 Sherman was the 105mm howitzer equipped version, which provided valuable fire support for the U.S. Army and Marines as well as extensive use in anti-tank operations.
Specifications for M4 Sherman 105mm Howitzer
Overall length: 6.197m
Overall width: 2.67m
Overall height: 2.94m
Weight, Combat Loaded: 31.48t
Weight, Unstowed: 28.486t
Actual Thickness, Angle w/Vertical
Hull Thickness:
Front: 63mm/47 degrees
Sides: 38mm/0 degrees
Rear: 38mm/10 degrees
Top: 19mm/83-90 degrees
Turret Thickness:
Front: 76mm/30 degrees
Sides: 51mm/0-5 degrees
Rear: 51mm/0 degrees
Top: 25.4mm/90 degrees
Gun Shield: 91mm/0 degrees
Armament: M4 105mm howitzer (X1), M1919A4 7.62mm machine gun (X2), M2 12.7mm heavy machine gun (X1).
Ammunition: 66 rounds 105mm, 4,000 rounds 7.62mm, 600 rounds 12.7mm.
Engine: Continental R975-C4 9-cylinder 4-cycle radial air cooled (15,945cc displacement, 460hp/2,400rpm output)
Maximum speed: 38.6hm/h, Cruising Range: about 161km, Crew: 5

Big and Overweight
The Tiger I was a roomy vehicle, it had approximately 220% the mass of the T-34, making it a large target, more difficult to conceal. The production version of the Tiger I turned out 11 tons heavier than the prototype, it weighed twice as much as the T-34. The enormous weight caused many problems which significantly reduced the combat value of the Tiger I.
Breakdown and Recovery
The great weight required a very sophisticated running gear with eight torsion bars and 24 staggered road wheels per side. If one of the inner road wheels was damaged, up to 13 road wheels had to be removed to get to it. In the combat zone, repairs of this kind would prove very hazardous to the crew, but there was little choice. Recovery from the combat zone was difficult, because the only armoured vehicle capable of towing a Tiger was another Tiger. Because of it's delicate drive train, the Tiger did not take kindly to such work, and the towing vehicles would frequently break down as well. On soft ground, turning or reverse driving was known to cause the track to ride up on the drive sprocket, jamming it. The tracks would have to be cut or blown apart to fix the jam, but it was generally considered safer to pull the vehicle back with the help of another Tiger.
Minimal Cruising Range
The Tiger was seriously underpowered. The compact Maybach HL 210, and later HL 230 engine provided 478 KW and 515 KW respectively, but that was not nearly enough for a vehicle weighing 56 tons. The road speed of 45 km/h may be considered acceptable, but fuel economy was very bad. It is important to remember that the German army had suffered serious fuel shortages in World-War One, and again in World-War Two. In 1942, the army which had invented the Blitzkrieg adopted a tank which was thoroughly unsuitable for mobile warfare. The Tiger I carried 534 liters of diesel fuel, and it had a range of only 60-100 km, depending on terrain conditions. By comparison, the T-34 had three times the range, using just 480 liters of diesel fuel. Refueling the Tiger in the combat zone would prove difficult, especially when allied fighters dominated the skies and hunted down the supply columns. Many Tigers were abandoned when they ran out of fuel.
Complicated Logistics
Tiger I tanks introduced a number of logistical problem the Wehrmacht had not known previously, and which minimized the operational usefulness of the vehicle. Fuel supply has already been mentioned, but the Tiger itself proved difficult to move from one objective to another. Tiger tanks required so much maintenance to keep them running, they could not normally be expected to reach deployment areas under their own power. Rail transport was essential. The loading and unloading of armoured vehicles from rail cars is a difficult process, but the Tiger required even more work. Each vehicle had a set of transport tracks which were fitted for rail transport. Sixteen road wheels had to be removed to fit the transport track, and the normal tracks had to be put on again before the unloaded Tigers advanced toward their objective. If railheads were lost or if the line was cut, operational mobility of the heavy tank companies was significantly reduced. Tiger tanks did travel long distances under their own power, out of necessity, and many vehicles broke down and were abandoned in the process.
Operational Limitations
Limited range and low mechanical reliability reduced the Tiger's operational flexibility to a point where the weapon system became difficult to re-deploy once it had been committed to battle. The decision to re-deploy would have to be balanced against the need to hold the ground and recover immobilized and defective Tigers. It became unthinkable that a heavy tank formation would strike out on its own like Rommel did when his division performed a daring breakthrough in France in 1940. Even a limited penetration like the 1944 offensive in the Ardennes quickly bogged down, because it involved Tigers and Panthers with limited operational mobility.
Rommel had transported his own fuel supply in 1940, and he conveniently pulled up at local gas stations to replenish his light tanks. By 1944, operational success or failure hinged on the capture of large enemy fuel dumps which might allow heavy tank formations to continue their mission. As it happened in the Ardennes, many Tiger and Panther crews eventually abandoned their run dry vehicles and walked home.
Technical Specifications
- Sonderkraftfahrzeug 181, Tiger I Ausführung E
- Engine: Maybach HL 210, V12-cylinder, 21353 cc, 478 KW @ 3000 rpm
- Maximum Speed: 45.5 km/h
- Fuel Capacity: 534 liters
- Fuel Consumption:
- 535 liters per 100 km on roads (T-34 used 160 liters per 100 km)
- 935 liters per 100 km cross-country
- Range: 100 km on roads, 60 km cross-country
- Armour Layout:
- Lower Hull Front - 100 mm of angled armour
- Gun Mantlet, Turret and Hull Front - 100 mm of vertical armour
- Turret and Hull Sides - 80 mm of vertical armour
- Floor and Roof - 26 mm of armour
- Length: 8434 mm
- Width: 3705 mm
- Height: 3000 mm
- Weight: 56900 kg
- Production: August 1942 - January 1944
Of the 1350 Tiger I Ausf. E built, approximately 800 were early types.
Historical Employment
- German Army, August 1942 - May 1945
Conversions
- Sturmpanzer VI mit 38 cm Mörser RW61 - Sturmtiger
- Berge-Tiger Recovery Vehicle
Like the French Char B1 and the Soviet KV heavy tank, the Tiger presented a serious problem tactically, but it could be singled out, stopped and destroyed once it had been identified by the enemy. Allied air supremacy worked against the Tiger, and so did the tank destroyers which provided immediate back-up for infantry and armoured formations facing Tigers in their sector of the front. Paradoxically, the army which defeated the Char B1 and the Maginot Line, eventually mimicked these same faulty strategies. The Battle of Kursk in July of 1943 was a Soviet victory, and it is considered the turningpoint in the east. Tank losses at Kursk included well over 400 Soviet and over 300 German vehicles, more than 10% of which were Tigers. In the west, the typical rate of exchange was three Shermans for every Tiger tank knocked out. A tactical simulation pitting the Tiger against five Shermans is included in Panzergranate rules, developed by Andrew Mark Reid.